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Case No. 20030283-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL ST A i I MINT 
Defendant appeals from his convict ions lor tornery, a ilv-rd degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (2003), and theft, a class A misdemeanor, i; violation . i 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (2003). This Court has jurisdiction pui ; 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
' > ! < ? " - .» . -
of the trial court. SeeBrvW"of 'Appellant !Pr -ip't. J //17-18. Nevertheless, he asks the Court 
to overrule this authority. Sec id. at /v. i he issue on appeal is: 
Has defendant cumed ;..o ouiucn 10 csta;. l th that Utah prec^uciii \\ iiici. jKMiiiis 
questions by jurors violates due process and, therefore, must be overruled? 
The party seeking to overturn precedent carries a '"substantial burden of persuasion' 
due to 'the doctrine of stare decisis.'" State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, Tf 11, 67 P.3d 477 
(quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 
(1995)). Here, the Court need not reach the merits because the due process claim was not 
preserved below and is not properly presented on appeal. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 
36, If 8, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (reaffirming preservation requirement); State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247,249-50 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining briefing requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Defendant seeks to overturn case precedent, but fails to acknowledge rule 17(i), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 2002, which reads: 
Questions by jurors, A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to 
a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall 
control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder 
of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow 
any question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any 
time. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should 
advise the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and 
submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should 
advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and 
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge 
may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall 
preserve the written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the 
judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask 
it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow 
counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's 
question. 
2 
The full text of rule 17 and other cited rules is attached in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with forgery and theft (R. 1, 58-59). On January 8, 2003, a 
jury trial was held (R. 54-55). During the course of the trial, jurors submitted in writing two 
questions they wished the victim to be asked (Rl 53:133-34). The court discussed the matter 
with counsel in chambers (R153: 133-37). See Addendum B (Ruling). Defense counsel 
objected to the questions, claiming that any questions by jurors impinged on a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by potentially interfering with a chosen trial strategy, and 
that the questions posed in this case were irrelevant and had been asked and answered (Rl 53: 
133-34). The court overruled the objections. The court concluded that questions by jurors 
were legally permissible in the court's discretion and that, in this case, the questions would 
clarify apparent jury confusion (R153: 133-37, 191). See Add. B. The court further ruled 
that the victim should be recalled by the prosecutor and the two jury questions posed. The 
prosecutor could then ask follow-up questions and defense counsel could cross-examine 
(R153: 136-37). See Add. B. Defense counsel did not object to this procedure. The victim 
was recalled, responded to the questions and a few follow-up questions, and was cross-
examined (R139: 140-46). See Addendum C (Moore Questioning). 
Later, when the investigating detective testified, jurors again submitted two written 
questions (Rl 53: 191 & 194). After unrecorded bench conferences, the court reminded the 
jury of previous testimony in response to one question and allowed the prosecutor to pose the 
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other question to the detective, after which defense counsel cross-examined (Rl 53:191 -205). 
See Addendum D (Reaves Questioning). There are no recorded objections to either question. 
The jury convicted defendant of forgery and theft (R. 106-07; R153: 243-50). In a 
separate proceeding, the jury found that defendant had twice before been convicted of theft, 
which permitted enhancement of the class A misdemeanor to a felony (Rl 53: 244-50). The 
court subsequently ruled that the certified copy of one of the prior judgments was not 
admissible because it was not properly signed and struck the felony enhancement (R152: 3-
4). On March 6, 2003, defendant was sentenced to the statutory term of zero-to-five years 
imprisonment on the forgery conviction and a concurrent one year term on the theft 
conviction (R. 127-28, 141-42; R152: 9-10). On April 3, 2003, defendant timely appeal (R 
130, 133, 139-40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Tom Moore felt sorry for defendant and his pregnant girlfriend and wanted to help 
them. He let them move into his home on March 1,2002 (Rl 53: 64-67). On April 23,2002, 
defendant stole $825.00 of Tom's money (R153: 67, 76-77, 82-83). 
# * * 
Tom, his girlfriend, Ora, and a friend, Edith, lived in his Ogden home (R153: 64). 
Tom did not know defendant or his girlfriend, but learned though a mutual friend that they 
needed a place to live and said they could move into his home temporarily (R153: 65). 
]The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the verdict and rulings. See 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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Tom needed to refinance his mortgage (R153: 67-68). Defendant told him about a 
Canadian loan company listed in the back of a business magazine (Rl 53: 67). Tom decided 
to apply for a $10,000.00 consolidation loan, but let defendant arrange it (R153: 68-69, 74). 
Defendant spoke to Rose Powers, one of the company's loan officers, and later told Tom that 
the company needed $825.00 as a down payment (R153: 68, 78, 142). Tom borrowed the 
down payment from Edith (R153: 68-69).2 
On April 23, 2002, Tom and defendant went to a Western Union outlet at a local 
grocery store to transfer the $825.00 down payment to Canada (R153: 69-75). Defendant 
filled out the necessary documents, including signing Tom's name to the "sending money" 
authorization (id.). Tom thought this was "a little strange," but was not concerned because 
his own handwriting was sloppy (R153: 70 & 91). Tom paid Western Union the $825.00 
plus what he thought was a $67.00 wire transfer fee and received a receipt in return (id.). The 
transfer fee was actually $65.00. The extra two dollars were a result of defendant adding a 
2
 The jurors submitted two written questions for Tom (R153: 133). The first 
question related to his need for the loan and read: "I don't know if it's relevant, but Mr. 
Tom—I'm confused why he would agree to go in the first place to send the down 
payment and still have to borrow money" (R153: 133). After the court ruled the question 
was permissible, Tom was recalled to the stand (R153: 139). The prosecutor identified 
the question as a juror's and asked: "Tm confused, why would you agree to go in the 
first place,' I'm assuming to the Western Union, 'but you still had to borrow money'" 
(R153: 143). Tom responded that he wanted the debt consolidation loan to refinance his 
home at a lower interest rate and to pay off some bills (R153: 143-44). He explained that 
he borrowed the loan down payment from Edith, but planned on paying her back from the 
loan proceeds (id.). The prosecutor asked why he needed to borrow the down payment 
and Tom explained that his mortgage payments were $750.00 and increasing to $850.00, 
which he could not afford (R153: 144). Edith offered to help because she also wanted 
lower expenses (R153: 144-45). Tom still owed Edith the money (R153: 145). 
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test question and answer to the Western Union forms, which served as a security code and 
permitted anyone with the test answer and the Western Union receipt to access the funds 
(R153: 100-03, 128-29). 
The two returned to Tom's house and Tom placed the Western Union receipt on the 
kitchen counter (R153: 76). Later that afternoon, defendant and his girlfriend left Tom's 
house (Rl 53:76-77). Tom assumed they were visiting friends because they left their clothes 
and cat behind, but they never returned (id.). 
A few days later, Tom spoke to Ms. Powers, the loan officer, on the telephone and 
was told the down payment had not been received (Rl 53:77-79).3 He looked for his Western 
Union receipt, but it was missing (Rl 53: 81 -82). Tom contacted Western Union and was told 
that five hours after the original transaction, they issued a full refund. Western Union had 
not required identification for the refund because the man seeking it knew the test answer and 
had the Western Union receipt (R153: 77-80, 106, 148-55). The man signed "Tom Moore" 
on the $825.00 refund check (R153: 131-32, 154-55). 
Tom located defendant (R153: 82). Defendant tearfully confessed that he had taken 
the money, said he was sorry, and promised to repay Tom (R153: 83). Over the next three 
3
 The second juror question for Tom was, "Does the loan exist in Canada?" (R153: 
133). The prosecutor told Tom that the jury wanted to know: "Does the loan officer exist 
in Canada?" (R153: 140). Tom explained that defendant made all the loan arrangements, 
but told him the loan officer's name was Rose Powers (R153: 140-42). Afer Tom became 
suspicious, he called the company and spoke to Ms. Powers, who told him the company 
never received the money (id.). 
6 
weeks, Tom spoke to defendant several times and each time defendant promised to repay 
him, but never did (R153: 83-84). On May 13, Tom called the police (R153: 160). 
Eyewitness identification by the Western Union employee confirmed that defendant 
took Tom's Western Union receipt, returned to Western Union, showed the receipt, knew the 
test question answer, and, without any other identification, obtained a refund check (R153: 
107-12, 116-21, 159-171, 188-93). Defendant then forged Tom's name as the endorser on 
the check and received $825.00 in cash (id.).4 
When confronted by the police, defendant fully confessed (R153: 171-88).5 
At trial, defendant did not testify or present witnesses (R153: 205). In closing, his 
counsel argued that the loan company might not exist and Tom Moore was not believable 
(R153: 234-36). The jury convicted defendant of forgery and theft (R. 106). 
4
 A juror asked in writing, "How did defendant manage to cash the check without 
Tom Moore's identification?" (R153: 194). After an unrecorded sidebar conference, the 
court reminded the jury of previous testimony which established that a refund could be 
obtained without personal identification if a person had the original Western Union 
receipt and knew the answer to the test question (R153: 194). 
5
 A juror asked in writing: "If forgery was involved, why didn't Detective Reaves 
question the Western Union signature" (R153: 191). When the prosecutor posed the 
question to the detective, he did not understand which signature the jury was referring to 
until the prosecutor explained that the jury wanted to know why he did not ask defendant 
if he had signed the refund request form (R153: 192). The detective explained that given 
the passage of time since the interview, he was not absolutely sure whether they discussed 
the refund request form in light of defendant's admissions that he forged the endorsement 
on the refund check and stole the money (R153: 192-93). The detective viewed the 
forged endorsement as more significant than the refund form because without the 
endorsement, the refund check could not have been cashed (id.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For over one hundred years, American courts have allowed questions by jurors. 
Today, almost every federal circuit and the vast majority of state jurisdictions permit the 
practice. Utah is no exception. In 1945, 1958, and 1989, the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically recognized a trial court's discretion to permit jurors to submit written questions 
to witnesses. In 2002, Utah formalized the practice through adoption of rule 17(i), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in 2003, through adoption of rule 47(j), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, both of which grant the trial court discretion to accept, modify, or reject questions 
by jurors. 
Without acknowledging the existence of the Utah procedural rules or the array of 
authority permitting the practice, defendant argues that this Court should overrule Utah 
Supreme Court case precedent because permitting questions by jurors violates due process 
in that it creates "role confusion" which "inherently prejudices" a defendant. Though the 
argument has been commonly made, no court has ever accepted it. Indeed, no court has ever 
concluded that permitting written questions by jurors violates any constitutional provision. 
In sum, defendant has not established a reason to overrule Utah precedent or to question the 
constitutionality of existing Utah rules. 
This Court need not reach the merits of the issue, however, because defendant failed 
to preserve a due process argument below and fails to meet briefing requirements on appeal. 
Moreover, even if the issue were preserved and adequately presented, this Court has no 
8 
authority to overrule clear Utah Supreme Court precedent. In any case, the existing 
procedural rule supersedes these prior cases. 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH PRECEDENT AND RULES GRANT A TRIAL COURT 
DISCRETION TO PERMIT WRITTEN QUESTIONS BY JURORS 
Since 1945, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized atrial court's authority to permit 
questions by jurors in civil or criminal trials. See State v. Anderson, 158 P.2d 127, 134 
(Utah 1945). Accord State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Martinez, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (Utah 1958). In 2002, the practice was formalized with the 
adoption of rule 17(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in 2003, with the adoption of 
rule 47(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Add. A. Nevertheless, defendant claims he 
was denied a fair trial because the jury submitted four written questions in this case, three of 
which were ultimately asked of witnesses, and one of which was responded to by the trial 
court. Defendant does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in this case or even 
that the specific questions prejudiced him. Rather, he claims that, as a matter of law, 
permitting any questions by jurors violates due process and inherently harms a criminal 
defendant (Br.Aplt. at 10 & 19). According to defendant, allowing jurors' questions allows 
a juror "to elicit evidence and fill in any holes that are in the State's case [and, thus,] absolves 
the prosecutor of its [sic] burden and the juror becomes the party that is producing evidence" 
{Br.Aplt at 10). Similar challenges have been rejected by every court which has considered 
them. See discussion, infra. 
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This Court need not reach the merits, however, because defendant has failed to meet 
the requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that he failed to preserve 
his due process argument below, and on appeal, fails to fully disclose the trial record, to fully 
acknowledge controlling authority, and to adequately brief the issue raised. Even if the due 
process issue were properly preserved and presented, this Court has no authority to overrule 
clear Utah Supreme Court precedent which permits the practice. In any case, the cases 
defendant challenges have been superseded by procedural rule. Consequently, defendant's 
appeal should be summarily rejected. 
(A) The Merits Should Not Be Considered Because Defendant Has Failed 
to Meet Preservation and Rule 24 Briefing Requirements, 
'"As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a 
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed 
plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.5" State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 
36, If 8, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 
1993)). "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, i t . . . 'must be specifically raised to a level 
of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal 
authority.'"/*/, (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, ^ 19, 58 P.3d 879). 
Additionally, appellate courts will not consider an issue which has not been properly 
and adequately briefed in compliance with rule 24(a)(9), which states that an appellant's brief 
"shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statues and parts of the record relied on." See 
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Add. A. "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development 
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority . . . This court is not a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research. " 
Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, % 20, 80 P.3d 546 (citing State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998)) (emphasis in original). Accord State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 1992). Here, defendant fails to meet these standards and, 
consequently, the merits of his argument need not be considered. 
Failure to Preserve. Below, defendant objected to the two questions submitted by the 
jury for Tom Moore (R153: 133-34). The questions were (1) whether the loan was real and 
(2) why did Tom borrow the down payment and seek the loan (id.). Defense counsel 
objected, claiming that the substance of the questions had already been asked and answered 
and that the questions were irrelevant to the case (id.). Defense counsel also objected on 
constitutional grounds: "I've got the Sixth Amendment denied [sic] his right to (inaudible) 
counsel to allow jurors to ask questions which may influence defense counsel's (inaudible) 
that's improper at (inaudible) ask questions (R153: 134). See Add. B. The prosecutor 
responded that she did not see how trial strategy was involved—the jury was simply confused 
despite Tom's earlier testimony concerning the circumstances of the loan (R153: 134-35). 
Defense counsel pointed out that if Tom were recalled, he could not testify that Rose Powers, 
the loan officer, actually existed, but only that he spoke to someone purporting to be Ms. 
Powers (R153: 135). See Add. B. Nothing in this exchange preserves defendant's current 
due process claim—made pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments—that 
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permitting questions by jurors improperly allows them to fill in "holes in the State's case" 
and "absolves the prosecutor of its burden" {Br.Aplt. at 10). Consequently, the argument is 
waived. 
Additionally, defendant claims that allowing the prosecutor to read the jurors' 
questions to Tom "impermissibly connected] the prosecutor and the jury [and] allowed the 
prosecutor to get inside the minds of the jurors" (Br.Aplt. at 14). Defendant, however, never 
objected to this procedure below—only to the questions themselves (R153: 133-37). See 
Add. B. Nor did defendant make any recorded objection to the subsequent questions 
submitted in connection with the detective's testimony (R153: 191 & 194). Without a 
specific objection below, defendant cannot now attack the method used in posing the jury's 
questions to Tom or to either the questions or procedure used in connection with the 
questions to the detective. 
Failure to Fully Disclose Facts and Law: Defendant appears to folly disclose the 
circumstances surrounding the questions posed by the jury and the court's ruling (Br.Aplt. 
at 6-8). Closer inspection reveals that he has not. Defendant reproduces two pages of the 
court's oral ruling, but omits any reference to the third page. Compare State's Statement of 
the Facts, supra, and State ysAdd. B, with Br.Aplt. at 7-8. Defendant claims that he objected 
to the questions posed to Tom Moore, but omits the page of the transcript (Rl 53:134), which 
establishes that his objection was based only on a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Compare State's Add. B, with Br.Aplt. at 6. He fails to acknowledge that he made no 
12 
recorded objections to the questions posed during the detective's testimony. Compare 
State's Add. D, with Br.Aplt. at 8. 
Similarly, defendant cites the three controlling Utah cases, which recognize a trial 
court's discretion to permit questions by jurors. See Br.Aplt at 17-18 (citing Johnson, 784 
P.2d 1135, Martinez, 326 P.2d 102, and Anderson, 158 P.2d 127). Yet, defendant fails to 
acknowledge that two months prior to his trial, Utah formalized this practice with the 
adoption of criminal rule 17(i). See discussion, infra, & Add. A. And eight months prior to 
the submission of defendant's brief, Utah again approved of the practice when it adopted 
civil rule 47(j), which is identical to rule 17(i). See text of rule 17(i), supra at 2, and the full 
text of both rules, Add. A. 
These omissions alone justify summary rejection of his claim. 
Failure to Adequately Brief. A party who seeks to overrule precedent has '"a 
substantial burden of persuasion' due to 'the doctrine of stare decisis.'" State v. Mauchley, 
2003 UT 10, Tf 11, 67 P.3d 477 (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), 
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995)). The party must examine historical development and 
current law to show that the precedent is "no longer sound because of changed conditions." 
Id. (other citation omitted). Or the party must establish that the precedent was "originally 
erroneous" due to its inherent weaknesses. Id. Ultimately, the party must demonstrate that 
"more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. Here, defendant has not 
attempted to meet this burden and, consequently, has not presented the legal analysis required 
by rule 24(a)(9) for a Mauchley-Menzies argument. 
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As will be discussed, infra, defendant examines none of the historical or current 
authorities, which overwhelmingly permit written questions by jurors. Nor does he 
acknowledge that the few jurisdictions which limit the practice do so only on supervisory, 
not constitutional grounds. See discussion, infra. Indeed, defendant cites no authority which 
directly supports his due process challenge, but cites only cases considering due process in 
other contexts (Br.Aplt. at 10-17). Given the wealth of authority and case law on questions 
by jurors, defendant's presentation of only a generalized due process argument results in 
inadequate analysis. Compare authorities cited, infra, with Br.Aplt. at 10-17. 
Moreover, it is only in the last two pages of defendant's generalized argument that he 
even acknowledges sixty years of Utah precedent which permits questions by jurors. 
Compare discussion, infra, with Br.Aplt. at 17-18. But having acknowledge the controlling 
case law, he analyzes it in the most cursory manner and summarizes his basis for overturning 
it in one-paragraph (Br.Aplt. at 17-19). Most egregiously, he does not acknowledge—much 
less analyze—the controlling criminal procedural rule, rule 17(i) (id.). 
In sum, defendant's brief wholly fails to meet analytical requirements. Consequently, 
it may be summarily rejected. In any case, even if defendant's challenge to the case 
precedent were adequately presented, he does not attack rule 17(i), which otherwise permits 
questions by jurors. Moreover, the argument is made in the wrong court: this Court has no 
authority to overrule clear Utah Supreme Court precedent. See State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 
8,U21,84P.3d841. 
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In sum, this Court should not reach the merits of the due process claim because it was 
not preserved below and is not properly or adequately presented on appeal. 
(B) Defendant Has Not Established Any Basis to Question the Soundness 
of Utah Precedent and Rule Which Permit Questions by Jurors, 
If this Court, nevertheless, considers the merits, it will find that Utah precedent is 
sound and rule 17(i) constitutionally permissible. 
Defendant argues that permitting questions by jurors violates due process because it 
permits jurors to "fill the holes" left by counsel's questions and "absolves" the prosecution 
of its burden of proof (Br.Aplt at 10). Defendant also claims that if the prosecutor is allowed 
to ask the questions of the State's witnesses, it impermissibly connects the prosecutor with 
the jury and allows the prosecutor "to get inside the minds of the jurors" (Br.Aplt. at 14). 
Similar arguments have been rejected by every court which has considered them. See, e.g., 
Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1144-45 (rejecting due process challenge that questions by jurors 
evidenced their premature deliberation of the case); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 
1078, 1086 (5th Cir.) (rejecting due process argument that questions by jurors "invade the 
province of trial counsel and distort the proper roles of counsel, judge and jury"), cert, 
denied, AAA U.S. 826 (1979); State v. Milligan, 11 P.3d 771, 777-78 (Colo. App.) (rejecting 
due process claim that questions by jurors are inherently prejudicial and constitute structural 
error); State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 233, 255-56 (Haw. 2001) (rejecting due process claim that 
jurors' questions render them impartial or impermissibly elicit prosecution evidence); State 
v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222, 226-30 (Ohio 2003) (rejecting due process challenge that juror 
15 
questioning distorts the adversary system and recognizing that the argument rests on "the 
erroneous premise that one must be passive to be impartial"); State v. Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, 
Tf 20 & Tf 28-32 (rejecting due process challenge that questions by jurors eliminates the 
prosecutor's burden of proof and noting the argument's false premise "that the burden of 
proof must be met solely through the questions and actions of the prosecutor"). 
While some courts have imposed procedural safeguards on questions by jurors—and 
some two to five states have prohibited the practice pursuant to their inherent supervisory 
powers—no court has concluded that screened written questions by jurors violate any 
constitutional provision. See Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980,986 n.15 (D.C. 1985) (noting 
that "[t]he only cases where juror questioning of witnesses has resulted in reversal have 
involved unsupervised in-court questions asked directly to the witness"); Martinez, 326 P.2d 
at 103 (reversing for abuse of discretion where trial court permitted a jury to call and, without 
restriction, directly question a witness, who neither party had called). See also Fisher, 789 
N.E.2d at 226-28 (after exhaustively citing cases from "every federal circuit" and "the vast 
majority of state courts," noting that only five jurisdictions prohibit jury questioning, but only 
two view such questioning as "inherently prejudicial," but not as a matter of constitutional 
law); Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, \ 12 (noting that "[ajlthough a few courts have prohibited 
questioning of witnesses by juries, none have held it unconstitutional"); Culkin, 35 P.3d at 
252-54 (same). 
"Juror questioning is neither radical or a recent innovation. The practice was 
historically part of the trial process and considered a useful tool in ascertaining the truth." 
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Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, % 12. As early as 1895, American courts permitted the practice. 
Fisher, 789 N.E.2d at 226-27. Today, every federal circuit which has considered the issue 
(ten of eleven circuits) and the vast majority of state jurisdictions recognize that a trial court, 
in its discretion, may allow questions by jurors. See, e.g.y Milligan, 11 P.3d at 777-78 
(providing overview of the wide-spread acceptance of questions by jurors in federal and state 
courts); Culkin, 35 P.3d at 253-54 (same); State v. Hays, 883 P.2d 1093, 1098-99 (Kan. 
1994) (same); Fisher, 789 N.E.2d at 226-28 (same). See also Carter v. State, 234 N.E.2d 
650, 652 (Ind. 1968) (holding that it is error to prohibit a trial court from exercising its 
discretion to permit questions by jurors, even if the practice should not be encouraged, and 
citing Anderson, 158 P.2d 127, in support). 
Moreover, the practice is approved by the American Bar Association and respected 
commentators. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d at 226-30 (discussing recognition by American Bar 
Association and social scientists that jurors' questions aids truth-finding, communication, 
understanding, and confidence in the judgment by all participants); Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, ^  
18 (recognizing that "scholarly and professional commentary is near unanimous in its support 
of jurors submitting question for witnesses"). Accord Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 
(recognizing that jurors may need to submit clarifying questions because sometimes "counsel 
are so familiar with a case they fail to see problems that would naturally bother a juror who 
is presented with the facts for the first time"). 
Utah first sanctioned the practice in 1945. InAnderson, 158P.2dat 128-29, the Utah 
Supreme Court found no error in the trial court inviting jurors to directly question witnesses. 
17 
Noting the general acceptance of questioning by jurors, the Utah court cautioned against 
encouraging a jury to directly ask questions, but concluded that it was permissible "in the 
sound discretion of the trial court" when "it will aid a juror in understanding some material 
issue involved in the case and ordinarily when some juror has indicated that he wishes such 
a point clarified." Id. In 1958, the supreme court again found the practice permissible, but 
found an abuse of discretion where the trial court repeatedly encouraged jurors to directly 
question witnesses and even invited them, "after retiring to deliberate, to question a witness 
who had not been called by either prosecution or defense, resulting in an indiscriminate 
posing of more than 50 questions." See Martinez, 326 P.2d at 103. But while condemning 
the excesses in that case, the court reaffirmed Anderson's principle that a trial court had the 
discretion to permit clarifying questions. See id. Most recently, in 1989, the supreme court 
concluded that no error occurred when two jurors directly asked questions of a witness. 
Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1144-45. Again, the supreme court did not encourage direct 
questioning, but recognized its permissibility and found no harm where the questions were 
merely for clarification. Id. 
Utah formalized the practice of questions by jurors and imposed procedural safeguards 
when it adopted criminal rule 17(i) in 2002 and civil rule 47(j) in 2003, both of which permit 
questions by jurors in the discretion of the trial court. The rules, reproduced in their entirety 
in Addendum A, recognize that a trial court, in its discretion, (1) may permit jurors to submit 
written questions in connection with a witness's testimony, which (2) the court will then 
screen to determine if the questions are acceptable, and (3) after considering any objections 
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of counsel, the court will decline, accept, or modify the questions, and then (4) the court will 
either ask the question or have counsel ask the question and any follow-up questions, with 
opposing counsel being given an opportunity to cross-examine. The current Utah rule 
accords with sixty years of Utah precedent, and is consistent with a century of American 
historical practice, the current practice in nearly every federal and state jurisdiction, and the 
recommendations of the American Bar Association. See citations, supra. Here, though not 
challenged by defendant, the court fully complied with the rule in permitting the questions. 
In sum, defendant has established no basis to conclude that granting a trial court 
discretion to consider questions by jurors violates due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions for forgery and theft should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A&^day of March, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney Ge#efaT\ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indi-
cated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal 
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the 
cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the 
addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically ar-
ranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief 
where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, in-
cluding for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of 
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceed-
ings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. 
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, 
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not 
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties 
or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective 
jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to 
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective 
jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attor-
neys as is material and proper. Prior to examining the jurors, 
the court may make a preliminary statement of the case. The 
court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a 
preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in 
advance of triaL 
I (b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that alternate 
jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order*in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqual-
I ified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be selected 
' at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the same 
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and 
challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same 
functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors. An alter-
nate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be 
discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict unless 
the parties stipulate otherwise and the court approves the 
stipulation. The court may withhold from the jurors the 
identity of the alternate jurors until the jurors begin delibera-
tions. If one or two alternate jurors are called each party is 
entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those 
otherwise allowed. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an 
objection made to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to 
the panel or (2) to an individual juror. Either party may 
challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on 
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceed-
ings. A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a 
material departure from the forms prescribed in respect to the 
drawing and return of the jury, or on the intentional omission 
of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in 
writing or be stated on the record, and must specifically set 
forth the facts constituting the ground of challenge. If the 
challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the jury so far 
as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory 
challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either 
peremptory or for cause. Each party shall be entitled to three 
peremptory challenges, except as provided under Subdivisions 
(b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objec-
tion to a particular juror and shall be heard and deterniined by 
the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be 
| examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A 
[challenge for cause may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a 
juror upon the same grounds. 
(f)(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law 
i to render a person competent as a juror. 
(f)(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to 
either party, or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(f)(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guard-
ian and ward, master and servant, employer and employee or 
principal and agent, to either party, or united in business with 
either party, or being on any bond or obligation for either 
party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and creditor 
shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a 
tax, license fee, or service charge for water, power, light or 
other services rendered to such resident. 
(f)(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on 
a previous trial between the same parties for the same cause 
of action, or being then a witness therein. 
(f)(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the 
result of the action, or in the main question involved in the 
action, except his interest as a member or citizen of a munic-
ipal corporation. 
(f)(6) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circum-
stances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is 
not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if 
challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and 
will act impartially and fairly. 
(g) Selection of jury. The judge shall determine the method 
of selecting the jury and notify the parties at a pretrial 
conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following methods 
for selection are not exclusive. 
(g)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon 
the number of jurors that are to try the cause plus such an 
additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all 
peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for 
cause that may be granted. At the direction of the judge, the 
clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear 
and determine challenges for cause during the course of 
questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the 
request of any party, shall hear and detennine challenges for 
cause outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge 
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the 
vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall 
provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning 
with the plaintiff, shall indicate thereon its peremptory chal-
lenge to one juror at a time in regular turn until all peremp-
tory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then 
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate 
jurors, and the persons
 / whose names are so called shall 
constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the 
last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(g)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number 
of jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional 
number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory 
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause that may 
be granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call 
jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine 
challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the 
end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, 
shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are 
completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remain-
ing, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall indicate 
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or 
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining iurors, or so 
many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names 
are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have 
been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(g)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in 
random order by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in 
that random order. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath 
must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they 
and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue 
between the parties, and a true verdict rendered according to 
the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
I (i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after impaneling 
1
 the jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqual-
ified to perform the duties of a juror and there is no alternate 
juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other jurors, 
or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
[parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and 
the case shall be tried with a new jury. 
(j) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit 
written questions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(j)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the 
judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its 
role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an 
investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from 
a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time, 
judge should advise the jurors that they may write the 
question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the 
bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the 
1
 jurors that some questions might not be allowed.
 ( j (j)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and 
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the 
question. The judge may disallow a question even though no 
objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written ques-
tion in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall 
ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party 
to ask it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The 
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to exam-
ine the witness after the juror's question. 
(k) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is 
proper for the jury to have a view of the property which is the 
subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact 
occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under 
thp charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to 
them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. 
While the jury are thus absent no person other than the 
person so appointed shall speak to them on any subject 
rnrmpcted with the trial. 
1^  (1) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to sepa-
rate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to 
jthem, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their 
duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed 
'by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the 
case is finally submitted to them. 
» (m) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted 
to the jury they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. 
If they retire they must be kept together in some convenient 
place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict 
or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having charge of them 
must not make or allow to be made any communication to 
them with respect to the action, except to ask them if they 
have agreed upon their verdict, and the officer must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the 
state of deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(n) Exhibits taken by jury; notes. Upon retiring for deliber-
ation the jury may take with them the instructions of the court 
and all exhibits which have been received as evidence in the 
cause, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the 
court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of 
unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit 
the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to 
take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them 
during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide 
jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking 
and using notes. 
(Q) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have-
retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them 
as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they may require the 
officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought 
.into court the information required must be given in the 
presence of, or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such 
[juiformation must be given in writing or stated on the record. 
,r ,(p) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged 
or prevented from giving a verdict for any reason, the action 
shall be tried anew. 
?i (q) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be 
sealed. While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned 
from time to time in respect to other business, but it shall be 
open for every purpose connected with the cause submitted to 
the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The 
court mav direct the iurv to briner in a sealed verdict at the 
opening ol the court, in case 01 an agreement during a recess 
or adjournment for the day. 
(r) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of 
them, or such other number as may have been agreed upon by 
the parties pursuant to Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict 
they must be conducted into court, their names called by the 
clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreperson; the verdict 
must be in writing, signed by the foreperson, and must be read 
by the clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is 
their verdict. Either party may require the jury to be polled, 
which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror if 
it is the juror's verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is 
an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury 
must be sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and 
the jury shall be discharged from the cause. 
(s) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal 
or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice 
of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17* The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear* 
and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, 
defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, 
the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from 
being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from 
trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, 
riotous, or obstreperous conduct. ; 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defen-
dant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the 
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to 
trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in 
the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall 
be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the 
consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by 
stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to 
trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of 
jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial 
shall proceed in the following order: 
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defen-
dant stated; 
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening 
statement and the defense may make an opening statement or 
reserve it until the prosecution has rested; 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the 
charge; 
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may 
present its case; 
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evi-
dence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other 
appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either 
side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall 
open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecu-
tion may close by responding to the defense argument. The 
court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel 
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during 
trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall 
proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been 
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number 
of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit 
written questions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the 
judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its 
role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an 
investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from 
a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the 
judge should advise the jurors that they may write the 
question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the 
bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the 
jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and 
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the 
question. The judge may disallow a question even though no 
objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written ques-
tion in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall 
ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party 
to ask it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The 
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to exam^ 
ine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of 
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some 
person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer 
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will 
suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak 
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the 
trial and to return them-into court without unnecessary delay 
or at a specified time. iV 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are 
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admon-
ished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among 
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and 
that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. -
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with 
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have 
been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in 
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such 
as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court 
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are 
entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes 
with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall 
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on 
taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they 
shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge 
of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the 
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and 
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to 
any person the state of their deliberations - or the verdict 
agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire 
to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they 
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communi-
cate such request to the court. The court may then direct that 
the jury be brought before the court, where, in the presence of 
the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be 
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its 
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having-
the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry 
*™A fha rpsnnnsfi thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, 
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, 
or the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or 
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an 
order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count 
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser 
included offense. 
Addendum B 
A 1 1 r :i g h t, ladies a ^  * ^ ^ 1 ° ^ ^ . v. - ' ^ - J *->a 
- '> ... recess unti * ruart .-r t : {: u : e 
.,a -i ^our seats a i. •- .-. , i -
i I ready <-w yu. Thanks. 
c !
 (Lunch recess taken.) 
(Whereurrr, an in-chambers conference was 
held.) 
T I IK r o r1 p ' I" ' ' I , ,- . J I L ii e record, I've 
receive] : >: » w r i t ten que s t i o n s f r o in the j u r y One 
C : • • E s 1 1 i = ] o a i i € :; : :i s t :i i i C a n a d a ? I p r o p o s e 
:
 ;
 thai v^ e ' ~3 , • h-i . n it M o o r e t e s t i f i ^ a \:. .t he 
- 1 . i . a . 
1 ^ I A n d l '-: - second cues1: ion is n-. r verv :r*. fully 
1 wc. - Ji, .: 
15 if -J.O'J relevant, br. * Mr, ~--n- .. ..: jcnfusei *hj he 
16 WO'UJ d agree to go in ;,ii- i , i. .
 r. lace and sti [J have to 
1 7 borrow inone y . ' "I,f ' 
18 ] For the record, Mr, Gravis objects to botl:i ::>f 
ly | these questions, or the Court giving answers to either 
20 • of these questions, because the evidence has. already 
2 : 
22 j MR. GRAVIS: There was a couple of other 
2 , 
24 I THE COURn Go aheai, I woi if I 
'2^, .xv... : i f f • : i i 11 i = (11 ia i i< i :i 1: ] = ) , 
• P-153 
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I've got the Sixth Amendment denied his right to 
(Inaudible) counsel to allow jurors to ask questions 
which may influence defense counsel's (Inaudible) that's 
improper at (Inaudible) ask questions. 
Number two, I object to the question — both 
of them have been asked and answered. 
Number three, they're irrelevant as to the 
fact — issues in this case, in any event. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Ms. Beaton, you may respond. 
MS. BEATON: I don't see how answering --
presumably we're talking about the second question right 
now. It's a situation where it would really involve 
trial strategy. We have a situation where either one or 
two jurors are confused about what has taken place. I 
don't see why I can't re-enter this evidence from Mr. 
Moore, or in my (Inaudible) refer them back to evidence 
that has already been provided in order to answer their 
questions. 
And I don't think as to the other question it 
has actually been asked or answered, as to whether or 
not Rose Powers actually -- the original ruling with 
regard to Tom Moore talking about the fact that he had 
made a call there and talked to her in return, that she 
had never received the money. At that time, Moore was 
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::»n 3 ] c o m i n g :i n f o r t h e s o ] e i > l i r p o s e o f :i d e n t :i f y i n g w h a t 
It was that he had done. 
*;o accua.liy come and r.estif-. Ives in
 wanada 
mirrently. so — ar. . .  u::i;. >. /*n *. J be appropridte 
iu:?- t-» -lerify for the jury as far as ihe State's aware 
.eiencidjii's sware that she actually exist-. 
MR. GRAVIS; x dun L WCHXL ^iiid.uc:h * T " ~- *~ * ~ 
whether she a c t u a 11 y e x i s t s a n y w ay. Somebod y ; - u i :; :rti n g 
iu j L O ue K O 5 6 r :»w e r s j I : I: • : s • :> in e b 
" T J ! -j * \ : •. •: :~ , c a n n o t test i f y she e xists, o r t h e ] : > a i I 
• g * • • 
< I THE COUF • ~ s my • : 3 i n g E " i r s t of a3 1, 
s 
". ; | c o u n t r y * . . w a r c r s * : s-• cue s t - ions * And _ i ir. 
] 6 I •, o: - , . : - . . • : , J :;:, ' . . . * . e SOP i n t h e cour t room, . An; 
1 1 | unde r s t and t h a t t h - r e ar.& some l a w y e r s t h a t a r e 
] 8 I . L j ^ n i n g t n . :. , • •
 ti + i, ,- i o ^ s l y , y o u d o . 
1 9 I At this point in my career, until I fe'el 
2 0' | stronger,- Ifm probably going ^o defer ^^ the lawyers. 
21 | And _i_j. the lawyers, Luth sides, m e e that juries may 
22 ! ask -uestions, then T I~ -'- ravor r th^* . If J-» side 
* ' . i 
-.:t.r.e b e t t e r , p r o b a b l y g o i n g : o s a : , •>.;/- t h e r e ' s 
. L t e 
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them to ask questions. 
Having said that, however, I have a 
responsibility to make sure that this case on both sides 
is fairly tried. And if an issue is ambiguous, so ~hat 
the fact finder is not certain about facts, whether they 
appear particularly relevant to us or not, but at least 
allow them to understand the case better, then I'm 
constrained to allow them to ask the question and to 
answer it. 
And while I won't invite them to ask 
questions, if they send me a note on their own, wanting 
something to be answered, then I'm going to allow them 
to do it. And we can do it one of two ways. We can 
send the note back in to them, which I only like doing 
after they're deliberating, or we put them back on the 
stand, a witness, and you will have in front of you both 
of these questions. And all I ask, so that we don't 
offer a lot of cumulative evidence and replow the ground 
again, that we very specifically, very pointedly ask in 
effect the jury's question and elicit that evidence. 
I'm going to then give you a chance, Mr. 
Gravis, to cross examine, so that at least there's been 
direct examination, cross examination, if necessary 
redirect examination and recross examination on any 
issue that the jury has asked. And then I'll just let 
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any .- tatement about what the d !_, -^ ri 
J T impr:mat iT thosri "acts ana th - >• «iou: i h--
L n s idcts • jnixvA J- v-iwxx t ifvuni- unuai >~\~* LIIXIUV L-iiat unSy 
hav-~ to ^~ T,U^+. T r,^r. happened, so t h a t 1 ^ vh-:4- T I^ *> •* v-
to ucj. ou x • in going iu give ~d uuth ox tneae questions 
and give you a chance to make the hest : f th-.-m *:1 ~t \ • 
T\: I v;h it : a :i * J ' . ; '3 ^e're ;oi:.i t > go 
LI » 
fro:,* 3 \* that the iui v know3 v.ha L W e ' r 3 dealing >. : 1 now 
a r e j u s t t: 1 1 e :j i 1 e s t :i o 1 :i s 11 1 a t \ \i 1 !i 1 1 d 11: 1 e n 
a t some point, w e '" 11 I ' _ _ ... a k e it clear t h a t w e f :i : e 
1 i . :oa;ving and you're just resuming your presenta ti. . n ~r 
18 • youi evidence. okay? 
19 ' MS BEATON: Okay. 
2 0 THE COURT: Thanks. 
21 (Conclusion of in-chamber conference and 
22 I parties returned to the courtroom.) 
2 3 j THE COURT 1 Before we begin, this has no thing 
2 ^ 1:1 i :i 1: 1 g I: : • • :i • : 1 1 i 11 1 11: 1 e 
2 5 j management of my courtroom We've been i 11 this bui 1 ding 




Mr . H r a v i s i s si f I i n«i a 1" , rm t 4 '-^ ^ f *-<=> " - ' ne with 
one another. 
0 NID E N TI!? ' IE1) S P E A K EI ' (11 i a u d i b 1 e ) . 
THE COURT: Okay, _ _ _:ii.::_ that probably 
;,:.• ..iow. • Okayr nere we go. 
MS. BEATON: Okay. The Judge had indicated to 
.c; o±d~;-s th^t they were (Inaudible) questions " i .TO 
8 i at tnis Lime, J. m goi ng to recall Mr. Moor 
he can clarify some .. those questions. 
TOM1 MOORE, 
< | called as a witness here, having been previous! y sworn 
I i i | M ' 11 K | i i I 111 I I I ] » ^ / d i i i i i i i J i j 11 I 1 i s I J I i h I 1 . ) 
, i f o l l o w s : 
D IRECT EXAMINATION 
Bf MS .
 B E A T O H . 
, i Q^ Agaix,, J ^ S L for the record, please state your 
name . 
A. Tom Moore. 
^, Okay. 
j-.r." ~;s you :; : i already been worn :n : :h j "lerk. 
A . :f(!i j; ; . 
.. . ftiss _ 



























One of the questions that we received was: 
"Does the loan officer exist in Canada?" 
Did you actually speak to somebody who worked 
for the company in Canada? 
A. Yes, Rose Powers. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: And I -- may I voir dire the 
witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. BEATON: If I could just have an 
opportunity to develop --
MR. GRAVIS: I'm going to object unless ha has 
personal knowledge of these people (Inaudible). 
MS. BEATON: Well, I think it's a foundational 
issue and I'd ask that I be allowed to (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I'll let you lay your foundation 
and then you can voir dire the witness. 
Q. BY MS. BEATON: What number did you use to 
call this company? 
A. It was an 800 number. I don't know the number 
offhand, off of memory. 
Q. Where did you get the number? 
A. Out of a business magazine. 
Q. What's the name of the company? 
_ _ _ _ ~ 






\ i i 11 ' I i I . 
0 , Win n you called the company/- did you ask to 
: , Y e s , I d :i d 
Q, An d di d a f emale answer the phone there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever actually met Rose Powers? 
£#. No, I haven f t. 
n
 Was there ever any discussion that that 
perso~, Rose rowe ' 
A, No. 
' ) . 
A -
Q. 
] f , r i Ei t: 1 i = r :i i l Cai la la ? 
And that w^ 3 the conversation t*hat- y w j ilQa 
-Loay .. J „ , _...;.... ;. _ £ M . hemselves 
i i 3 3 Rose Powers? 
A. Correct. 
Okay. 
Now, j n talking to this person, did she seem 
^^ to be familiar with the app 1 1 c at i oi I p i ocess 11: Iat ;: , • : i 
°
 /
 ' ilrc~iy discussed? 
^ o i ~ T - . c: 
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Union and the money was not there. 
Q. Okay. 
In talking with her, did you originally talk 
to her at any point in time prior to discovering that 
there was possibly a problem with this transaction, 
after you actually went over to the Western Union 
office? 
A. No, I hadn't. 
Q. Okay. 
And I think what you indicated earlier is that 
you believed that the defendant had already talked to 
Rose Powers? 
A. Yeah, before I wired the money. 
Q. Okay. 
And in speaking with the defendant, did he 
identify the loan officer or the person that he was 
dealing with by the name of Rose Powers? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Okay. 
And is that the way that you knew who to call 
at the company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because at the time that you made your call, 
did you have any of the paperwork then from the wire 
25 I transfer? 
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, J . ± , »w^ 4. uvw u I / S l l O V S x Cl iui IN O • 
I MS. BEATON; All right, T think that's t he o ne 
.' * => r t- i (-1 n , 
THE COURT" "" *. i-. ' 2 fore ycu /;e • - :h 
| the witness? 
MR GRAV IS i Nof . _ J ..:. now. 
T:; '" '"V)i'R ' 
n. . , ,..
 tN, : . ..xd ;.ien the next question ±r 
indicates. ^ ' *LI ^onfused, why would you ^:r ey to 3 -
the first place," T r™ assuming ^^ the Western Union, 
'uui. y^u still had to borrow mone -
And so maybe we n-e 1 r > =.ck • :•> . When jhat 
wd^ > m e reas- r 4 * : ? ? 
A. ~ :e Dt consolidation. 
Q- i li I i I MI h ! v ii ixp-jij L L ]et? 
A " ' -
Q. " .:. _i *. . oan w. =inw 
\I -f : roperty or a heme - r anything of that: nature? 
A. -;n . 
• _ O k a y . 
What is the reason, then, that y ~ u decided 
that you would go out and borrow tne c y: -< ' - i 
origination fee of $825 i n order •*• * get * his loan? 
A . o 1 11 i d d t: : • 
page 143 
refinance my house while the interest rates were lower. 
Q. Okay, 
A. And, you know, take care of some bills I had. 
Q. Did you plan on using the $10,000 loan also to 
pay off the person who gave the initial money to you in 
order to get this loan? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. If you originally did not have the $825 that 
you needed in order to get this loan, what's the reason 
that you decided that it would be a good idea to borrow 
it from somebody else? 
A. Well, she was staying at my house and, you 
know, I was just helping her out, too, kind of like I 
was him. And so she had some money and she says, "Well, 
if you can do that, then we can get the lower payment on 
the house going," because my mortgage payment was 
killing me at the time. 
Q. How much was your mortgage payment at the 
time? 
A* It was 750 and then it was going to balloon to 
850. It was on a weird kind of a rate and with the 
mortgage rates dropping at that time, you know, I 
figured well, if I refinance, I can drop my monthly 
payment substantious -- you know, and save some money. 
Q. So this woman who decided to loan you the 
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w e l l ? 
• • ; ; 
Q.. • . ^  t h i s ' p e r s o n t h e n k i c k i n g i n on a p o r t i o n 
i I I I I) i i s ; ; i
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A, Yeah f she's helped out more than her fa I r 
Q. No w so I i i nde rs t a nd t hi s , a re you, yourself • -
'" . . ~ e o u t 11 I e 3 8 9 2 , i n c 1 u d i n g t h e f" e e for Western 
I \) i 'Jnic? 
I J a Correct. 
12 \J* And do you still owe this loan iu ; ' 
1 3 of yours w v c originally loaned you the money? 
14 
1 " ! M S . B E A T;. N i X d o i if 1 : t h i n k I h a v e a. n y f u r t h e r 
quest :i oi is . 
CRQS S EXAMIMATION 
- ! BY MR. G R A V I S : 
Q. Mi ' i1 i' 11 i i iJrJ L au t e d W e s t e r n U n i o n d i d n ' t 
thev tell j--.!-. til::: L : you filed a police report they 
. ._ ] never t-he fraud? 
A. They actually had told me originairy Liiey 
2 4 I thought they would be able to do they shoi; 1 o n ! : have 
2 5 g i v e n me a - - c : : g i i = : :i : e f i i : : d • :i h e « :: ] : • : • n 1 1 ,r 1 1 , a t 1:1 i e y 
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would issue one to me. And then they told me, "No, you 
have to get ahold of the police department," 
Q. So you called the police department? 
A, Correct. 
Q. And you say you're still in (Inaudible) 
Western Union? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Now, did you ever fill out any loan 
application papers? 
A. No, I didn't. It was that I would send that 
off. Steven was handling that for the loan. It was 
dumb on my part, yes. 
MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further. 
MS. BEATON: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Any further questions? 
MS. BEATON: No. 
THE COURT: All right, you may step down. 
Thank you. 
MS. BEATON: The state now calls Karen Smith. 
KAREN SMITH, 
called as a witness here, having been duly sworn 
by the clerk to speak to the truth, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
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Addendu; > 
1 MS. BEATON: I have no further questions, 
2 THE COURT: Would you like me — 
3 MS. BEATON: And move for what's been marked 
4 as State's Exhibit 5 be admitted. And I'd move for 
5 admission also of State's Exhibit No. 6. 
6 MR. GRAVIS: May we approach the bench, Your 
7 Honor? 
8 THE COURT: Yes. 
9 (Whereupon, a side-bar conference was held.) 
10 MS. BEATON: Okay. And just for the record, 
11 at this point, this Exhibit No. 6 (Inaudible) 5, 1, 2, 3 
12 and 4 have been admitted. 
13 (State's Exhibit No. 6 received into 
14 evidence.) 
15 Q. BY MS. BEATON: Detective Reaves, there was a 
16 question that came in from the jury that indicates, "If 
17 a forgery was involved, why didn't Detective Reaves" — 
18 it says (Inaudible) but it's Reaves -- "question the 
19 Western Union signature?" 
20 So why didn't you question the defendant about 
21 the signature on the Western Union form? 
22 A. I'm not sure which signature would be in 
23 question. I'm not understanding the question. There's 
24 so many forms on that I'm not sure which one would be... 
25 Q. In this particular case, Tom Moore's name is 
I F»tB^ 
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signed on three different — in three different areas. 
A* Okay. 
Q. You talked to him a little bit about the 
question when they're sending the money, there's a 
reference, and the defendant claims he had permission 
from Tom to sign that. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And we've talked about that. There is also a 
signature that you talked about on the check itself in 
order to get the refund. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You talked to the defendant about that. I 
believe the question is: Why didn't you talk to the 
defendant about this — this signature right here, that 
was filled out in conjunction with the refund form from 
Western Union? 
A. You know, I believe that you actually did ask 
me something about that. I can't honestly sit here and 
testify that I didn't put it in the statement I had with 
Mr. Manchester and it's not in my case (Inaudible). And 
because of the time length, I cannot tell you that I 
specifically asked him about that or not, and I don't 
want to give the wrong impression either way. And so I 
hope that answers the question. 
Q. Is your answer, then, you did not discuss with 
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him what's been marked as State's Exhibit 2, that 
particular signature? 
A. What my answer is, I could not honestly — I 
would assume that I would have, but when I go down to 
the specific questioning and the answering, I did not 
put it in here. Most likely, as I would do in every 
case, did you do this, did you do this, did you do this, 
(Inaudible) down there, I did not bring it to this 
statement about that particular signature. 
Q. Is there any reason why you (Inaudible) marked 
State's Exhibit No. 4 (Inaudible)? 
A. Well, because the way I view this here, this 
is the transaction that actually made the theft, that 
actually made the forgery itself. In other words, if it 
wasn't for this signature here in the back and here, Mr. 
Manchester would not have received the $825. By simply 
signing (Inaudible) the fees does not necessarily give 
him the money. This is the actual money transaction, 
which is the actual check which is issued out to Mr. 
Moore and Mr. Moore's signature is not — the proper 
signature is not on here and that's the one that he was 
admitting to. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So that was probably a lower thing or — to 
me, maybe I didn't understand it correctly, but that 
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tied in exactly to -- that created a refund where this 
is actually the one that created the refund. 
Q. The check itself? 
A. The check itself, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
MS. BEATON: I don't have any further 
questions of this witness. 
THE COURT: Will both the lawyers approach for 
just a minute, please. 
(Whereupon, a side-bar conference was held.) 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, one of your 
members passed the Court a note with this question: 
"How did Steven Manchester manage to cash the check 
without Tom Moore's identification?" 
The testimony was that this check could be 
cashed with one of two ways, either with an 
identification or having the original receipt that had 
the test question. And the evidence is that he used 
the --
MR. GRAVIS: Let the person who cashed the 
check (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: That's right. The person who had 
the -- who cashed the check had the original receipt 
with the test question. 
MS. BEATON: With that, I'm done questioning 
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Detective Reaves. 
THE COURT: You may cross examine, Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS; Thank you, Your Honor, 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. Okay. Now, when you first got assigned this 
case, you got a report from the initial officer who 
handled it; right? 
A. I did, sir. 
Q. Would that be A. Silva? 
A. I'd have to look at the — I don't have the — 
I have my report up here but I don't have the original. 
Q. (Mr. Gravis hands he report to the witness.) 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. Okay. 
You reviewed that report before you ever 
talked to Mr. Moore; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. 
Now, when you talked to Mr. Moore, you've read 
the report, he tells you that he discovered this alleged 
forgery and theft a couple of days later, when he talked 
to the defendant? 
A. Well, if you get this -- where are you 
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